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We analyze Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly
with more than two firms in which the firms produce differentiated substi-
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we show the following results. If the marginal cost of a firm is lower (higher)
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1
1. Introduction
We analyze Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly with
more than two firms in which the firms produce differentiated substitutable goods
and seek to maximize their relative profits instead of their absolute profits.
For analyses about relative profit maximization please see Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1990), Lu (2011), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) and Schaffer
(1989). Some other related results are mentioned in Section 6.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of hu-
man. Even if a person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns
a bigger money than him, he is not sufficiently happy and may be disappointed.
On the other hand, even if he is very poor, if his neighbor is more poor, he may be
consoled by that fact. About the behavior of firms, we think that firms in an indus-
try not only seek its own performance but also want to outperform the rival firms.
TV audience-rating race and market share competition by breweries, automobile
manufacturers, convenience store chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in
Japan, are examples of such behavior of firms.
In the next section we present the model, in Section 3 and 4 we investigate the
outputs and prices at Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, and in Section 5we compare
Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. In Section 6 we mention some related results in
other works.
2. The model
There are 𝑛 firms. 𝑛 is an integer larger than 1. They produce differentiated
substitutable goods. The output and the price of the good of Firm 𝑖 are denoted by
𝑥𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖. The inverse demand functions of the goods are
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛, (1)
We assume 𝑎 > 0 and 0 < 𝑏 < 1. From (1) we obtain the following ordinary
demand functions (See Appendix 1).
𝑥𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑏)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
⎡⎢
⎣
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
, (2)
𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
The inverse and ordinary demand functions are symmetric for the firms.
3. Cournot equilibrium under relative profit maximization
In this section we assume that each firm determines its output given the outputs
of other firms so as to maximize its relative profit. Let denote the absolute profit
of Firm 𝑖 by 𝜋𝑖. Then,
𝜋𝑖 = ⎛⎜
⎝
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
The relative profit of Firm 𝑖 is defined as the difference between its absolute profit
and the average of the absolute profits of other firms. Denote it byΠ𝑖. Then,
Π𝑖 =⎛⎜
⎝
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 −
1
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
⎡⎢
⎣
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑎 − 𝑥𝑗 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑗
𝑥𝑘⎞⎟
⎠
𝑥𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗𝑥𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
,
𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
Differentiating Π𝑖 with respect to 𝑥𝑖 for each 𝑖, the conditions of relative profit
maximization for the firms are obtained as follows.
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 −
(𝑛 − 2)𝑏
𝑛 − 1
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗 = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
From this, we have
𝑥𝑖 =
𝑛 − 1
2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖) −
(𝑛 − 2)𝑏
2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑗,
and
𝑛𝑎 − 2
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖 − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖 = 0.
The latter equation means
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖 =
1
2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖⎞⎟
⎠
.
Then, we get the equilibrium output of Firm 𝑖 as follows.
𝑥𝐶𝑖 =
𝑛 − 1
2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
− (𝑛 − 2)𝑏[2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏][2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖⎞⎟
⎠
, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
𝐶 indicates Cournot. The equilibrium price of the good of Firm 𝑖 is
𝑝𝐶𝑖 =𝑎 − 𝑥𝐶𝑖 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝐶𝑗 =
𝑛 − 1 + 𝑏
2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
− 𝑛𝑏[2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏][2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
+ 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
4. Bertrand equilibrium under relative profit maximization
In this section each firm determines the price of its good given the prices of
the goods of other firms so as to maximize its relative profit. The absolute profit
of Firm 𝑖 is written as
𝜋𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑏)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
⎡⎢
⎣
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖).
The relative profit of Firm 𝑖 is
Π𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑏)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
⎡⎢
⎣
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
− 1(1 − 𝑏)(𝑛 − 1)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
{(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑗
+ 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑗
𝑝𝑘}(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗).
DifferentiatingΠ𝑖 with respect to 𝑝𝑖, the conditions of relative profit maximization
for the firms are obtained as follows.
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗 + [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑐𝑖 (3)
− 𝑏𝑛 − 1
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗) = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
Then, we get the equilibrium price of the good of Firm 𝑖 as follows (See Appendix
2).
𝑝𝐵𝑖 =
(𝑛 − 1)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
− 𝑛𝑏[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏][2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏][2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
+ 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
𝐵 indicates Bertrand. The equilibrium output of Firm 𝑖 is
𝑥𝐵𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑏)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]{[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏](𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖) − [1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏](𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
− 𝑏⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
+ 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)}
= [𝑛 − 1 + (𝑛
2 − 3𝑛 + 1)𝑏]
(1 − 𝑏)[2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏](𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
− (𝑛 − 2)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]𝑏(1 − 𝑏)[2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏][2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
,
𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
5. Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
Let us compare the outputs and prices at the Bertrand equilibrium and those at
the Cournot equilibrium. Comparing the output of Firm 𝑖 at the Bertrand equilib-
rium and that at the Cournot equilibrium,
𝑥𝐵𝑖 − 𝑥𝐶𝑖 =
𝑛(𝑛 − 2)𝑏2(∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗 − 𝑛𝑐𝑖)
(1 − 𝑏)[2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏][2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]. (4)
Comparing the price of the good of Firm 𝑖 at the Bertrand equilibrium and that at
the Cournot equilibrium,
𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑝𝐶𝑖 =
𝑛(𝑛 − 2)𝑏2(𝑛𝑐𝑖 −∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗)
[2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏][2(𝑛 − 1) − (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]. (5)
5.1 A special case 1: duopoly
Since in a duopoly 𝑛 = 2, from (4) and (5) we get
𝑥𝐵𝑖 − 𝑥𝐶𝑖 = 0,
and
𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑝𝐶𝑖 = 0.
Therefore, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 In a duopoly Bertrand and Cournot equilibria coincide whether
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 or 𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2.
5.2 A special case 2: symmetric oligopoly
In a symmetric oligopoly all 𝑐𝑖 are equal, and so
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗 = 𝑛𝑐𝑖 for all 𝑖.
Then,
𝑥𝐵𝑖 − 𝑥𝐶𝑖 = 0, and 𝑝𝐵𝑖 − 𝑝𝐶𝑖 = 0.
Thus, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 In a symmetric oligopoly Bertrand andCournot equilibria coincide
regardless of the number of firms.
5.3 A general case: asymmetric oligopoly
Assume that 𝑛 ≥ 3, and the marginal costs of the firms may be different each
other. From (4) we find that 𝑥𝐵𝑖 = 𝑥𝐶𝑖 if and only if 𝑐𝑖 =
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 . Also from (5)
𝑝𝐵𝑖 = 𝑝𝐶𝑖 if and only if 𝑐𝑖 =
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 . If 𝑐𝑖 <
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 we have 𝑥𝐵𝑖 > 𝑥𝐶𝑖 and 𝑝𝐵𝑖 < 𝑝𝐶𝑖 .
And if 𝑐𝑖 >
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 we have 𝑥𝐵𝑖 < 𝑥𝐶𝑖 and 𝑝𝐵𝑖 > 𝑝𝐶𝑖 . Therefore, we obtain the
following results.
Proposition 3 In an asymmetric oligopoly, if the marginal cost of a firm is lower
than the average marginal cost over the industry, its output at the Bertrand equi-
librium is larger than that at the Cournot equilibrium, and the price of its good at
the Bertrand equilibrium is lower than that at the Cournot equilibrium.
On the other hand, if the marginal cost of a firm is higher than the average
marginal cost over the industry, its output at the Bertrand equilibrium is smaller
than that at the Cournot equilibrium, and the price of its good at the Bertrand
equilibrium is higher than that at the Cournot equilibrium.
6. Relations with other results
Absolute profit maximization If firms in an oligopoly seek to maximize their
absolute profits, the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria do not coincide whether the
goods of firms are differentiated or homogeneous.
Relative profit maximization with a homogeneous good By Vega-Redondo
(1997), in a framework of evolutionary game theoretic model, it was shown that in
an oligopoly in which firms produce a homogeneous good and seek to maximize
their relative profits, the Cournot equilibrium coincide with the outcome of perfect
competition.
With differentiated goods, however, the Cournot equilibrium under relative
profit maximization is not equivalent to perfect competition.
Delegation problem Miller and Pazgal (2001) has shown the equivalence of
price strategy and quantity strategy in a delegation game when owners of firms
control managers of firms seek to maximize an appropriate combination of abso-
lute and relative profits.
But in their analyses owners of firms themselves still seek to maximize abso-
lute profits of their firms. On the other hand, in this paper we do not consider a
delegation problem, and we assume that owners of firms seek to maximize their
relative profits.
Duopoly In Tanaka (2013) and Satoh and Tanaka (2014), assuming linear de-
mand functions and constant marginal costs, it was shown that in a duopoly, in
which firms produce differentiated goods, andmaximize their relative profits, Bertrand
and Cournot equilibria are equivalent in the sense that the output and the price of
each firm's good at the Bertrand equilibrium are equal to those at the Cournot
equilibrium whether they have the same cost functions or different cost functions.
Since 𝑛 = 2 in duopoly, the conditions of relative profit maximization at the
Cournot equilibrium are reduced to
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
Then
𝑥𝑖 =
𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖
2 .
Thus, the equilibrium output does not depend on the cost of the rival firm. On
the other and, the conditions of relative profit maximization for the firms at the
Bertrand equilibrium are reduced to
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏𝑝𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑏(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗) = (1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑏𝑐𝑗 = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.
By the inverse demand functions this is rewritten as
𝑎−𝑏𝑎−2𝑎+2𝑥𝑖+2𝑏𝑥𝑗+𝑐𝑖+𝑏𝑐𝑗 = −𝑎+2𝑥𝑖+𝑐𝑖+𝑏(−𝑎+2𝑥𝑗+𝑐𝑗) = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.
Since 0 < 𝑏 < 1 this equation is equivalent to the condition of relative profit
maximization at the Cournot equilibrium for Firm 𝑖 and 𝑗.
The result of this paper is an extension and generalization of the result in a
duopoly to an asymmetric oligopoly.
Relation between relative profit maximization and zero-sum game A game
of relative profit maximization by firms in oligopoly (or duopoly) is an 𝑛-person
(or two-person) zero-sum game. Let 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 be the payoffs of two players in a
two-person zero-sum game, the relation 𝑢2 = −𝑢1 is satisfied. But in an oligopoly
such a relation does not hold. Let 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛 be the payoff of Player 𝑖 in an
𝑛-person zero-sum game. Then, ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑢𝑖 = 0, and 𝑢𝑖 = −∑𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑢𝑗 are satisfied.
𝑢𝑖 is not the opposite of another player's payoff. This fact seems to be the reason
that coincidence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria does not hold in oligopoly.
Appendix 1: Calculations of the ordinary demand functions
For 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, we have
𝑝𝑗 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝑗 − 𝑏𝑥𝑖 − 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑖,𝑗
𝑥𝑘.
Thus,
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗 = (𝑛 − 1)𝑎 − (𝑛 − 1)𝑏𝑥𝑖 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗.
From this
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑥𝑗 =
1
1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
⎡⎢
⎣
(𝑛 − 1)𝑎 − (𝑛 − 1)𝑏𝑥𝑖 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
.
Substituting this into (1),
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑝𝑖 −
𝑏
1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
⎡⎢
⎣
(𝑛 − 1)𝑎 − (𝑛 − 1)𝑏𝑥𝑖 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
.
Then, we obtain the following ordinary demand functions.
𝑥𝑖 =
1
(1 − 𝑏)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
⎡⎢
⎣
(1 − 𝑏)𝑎 − [1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑝𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
Appendix 2: Calculations of the Bertrand equilibrium prices
(3) is rewritten as
[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏](𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖) − 2[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏](𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)
− 𝑏 ⎡⎢
⎣
(𝑛 − 1)𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑐𝑗⎤⎥
⎦
− 𝑏𝑛 − 1
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗) = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
From this we obtain
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 =
𝑛 − 1
2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏
⎧{
⎨{⎩
[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏](𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖) − 𝑏⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
⎫}
⎬}⎭
+ (𝑛 − 2)𝑏2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗),
and
[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏] ⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖⎞⎟
⎠
− 2[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
− (𝑛 − 1)𝑏 ⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖⎞⎟
⎠
− 𝑏
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) = 0.
The latter equation means
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖) =
1 − 𝑏
2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑖⎞⎟
⎠
.
Then, we get the equilibrium price of the good of Firm 𝑖 as follows.
𝑝𝐵𝑖 =
(𝑛 − 1)[1 + (𝑛 − 1)𝑏]
2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏(𝑎 − 𝑐𝑖)
− 𝑛𝑏[1 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏][2(𝑛 − 1) + (𝑛 − 2)(2𝑛 − 1)𝑏][2 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑏]
⎛⎜
⎝
𝑛𝑎 −
𝑛
∑
𝑗=1
𝑐𝑗⎞⎟
⎠
+ 𝑐𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑛.
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